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In this article I will first establish that attention to fragile states is not on the agenda of the current Brazilian government. Then I will try to explain the major factors contributing to the exclusion of this issue from President Luis Inácio Lula da Silva’s 
foreign policy, which essentially have to do with the dif-
ficulty for Lula, his government, and his party in dealing 
with their left of centre supporters.
Lula’s Party, the PT (Worker’s Party) is a large and heter-
ogeneous coalition ranging from far-left to centre-left, and 
his government enlarged its support, attracting small right 
of the centre parties and even old nationalist groups on the 
far right. His term has been highlighted by a deep divide 
between a conservative monetary policy (often termed as 
neo-liberal), and a strong drive towards a state-led, market 
unfriendly sort of political economy (Albuquerque, 2002, 
p. 25). On the other hand, from the beginning, his foreign 
policy has been underscored by a predominance of leftist 
orientations.
The colliding agendas of Lula’s pro-market advisors 
in charge of financial, trade-related and economic mat-
ters, as opposed to Lula’s political friends and party com-
rades, have been taken for granted as a single consistent 
one. Moreover, on the external front, the most ideological 
aspects of this agenda have prevailed. As a consequence, 
Lula’s foreign policy encouraged anti-globalization ideas 
and movements while discouraging international coopera-
tion against terrorism, allegedly, because its deep causes 
are social injustice and economic inequalities, and are not 
political or ideological (Amorim, 2005, p. 53).
As a consequence, his foreign policy has often been 
criticized as erratic and inconsistent. In this article I will 
try to show that it is rather a matter of consistency with 
colliding goals than sheer inconsistency. My argument is 
that Lula’s foreign policy, in his first term, pursues three 
different and diverging agendas (Albuquerque, 2005, p. 91, 
Almeida, 2006, p. 557).
Not in the Agenda
Surprising as it is, the most politicized foreign policy 
ever adopted by a Brazilian president, who is also consid-
ered the most committed to dealing with the issues of glo-
bal poverty, endemic hunger and social injustice at large, 
does not explicitly include a policy designed to deal with 
fragile states. Even more surprising is the fact that the link-
age between state weakness and social injustice, endemic 
hunger and poverty is often acknowledged by Brazilian 
foreign policy officials, as well as by President Lula himself. 
The same applies to the linkage between terrorism and so-
cial injustice1, often evoked by the Brazilian diplomacy to 
advocate multilateral humanitarian programs as opposed 
to, and in clear disavowal of, the war on terrorism adopted 
by the Bush administration. Nevertheless, the conclusion 
that the theme of fragile states needs a specific policy is 
missing.
Este artigo teve origem como um paper inicialmente prepa-
rado para a Conferência sobre Canadá e os BRICs, realizada 
em Ottawa em março de 2006, e posteriormente publicado 
pela Canadian Foreign Policy.
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Lula’s foreign policy, in his first term, pursued three 
different and diverging agendas.
Such expressions as “fragile and/or weak states”, “state 
building”, or “unstable states”, are absent in the Brazilian 
diplomatic vocabulary, even when President Lula addresses 
“… a legacy of social and economic stagnation, political vi-
olence and foreign interference” (Amorim, 2006). Instead, 
the preferred phrases are “the search for the peaceful settle-
ment of disputes”, “being instrumental to restoring peace”, 
“restoration of democracy in a small country”, and so on. 
A survey of official statements by President Lula himself, 
his Foreign Minister Celso Amorim, and the Vice-minister 
Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães2, shows a meaningful absence 
of this theme and other connected issues.
No statements, articles or interviews by foreign policy 
officials, such as presidential and ministerial aides and ca-
reer diplomats, have been found dealing specifically with 
policies addressing the issue of fragile states in relevant ar-
eas of the Brazilian foreign ministry, such as international 
cooperation or international organizations. As for politi-
cal organizations and coalitions mentioned on the official 
website of Itamaraty3, the web page on the Group of Rio4, 
the political Latin American summit (considered as a sort 
of OAS without the United States and Canada) was not to 
be found in early March 2006. The web page on the Ibero-
American summit5 is in the process of being updated. The 
G-156 page was last updated in 2001 and the last statement 
posted is from Marco Maciel, former vice-President (1995-
2003). No information at all on the subject is available in 
the Atlantic Zone of Peace’s web page7. A brief explanatory 
note is all that is found under OAS, UN Security Council, 
and UN Peace Missions.
Under “Foreign Policy” or in a general search of 
President Lula’s and high level officials’ pronouncements 
in 2003-2006, only a small number of statements, speeches 
and interviews have been found that might address the is-
sue. 
Surprisingly, the highly influential Vice-minister, 
Ambassador Guimarães, who, at one point, had been in the 
public eye, and even in the first years of the Lula presidency 
had been quoted as contributing to a number of academic 
and journalistic articles, seems to have been silenced; only 
his inaugural speech in January 2003 as Vice-minister is 
available. In some cases, the most recent statements are 
from Ambassador Lampreia and Professor Lafer, both of 
whom served with former President Cardoso (1995-2003) 
as foreign ministers. The web page on international organ-
izations and political groups, which recently contained rel-
evant and detailed information about the G3 (Brazil-India-
South Africa), the G4 (Brazil-India-Japan-Germany) and 
other initiatives, was found to be very meager.
As a result, I was able to use only one speech of 
President Lula and four of Celso Amorim, his Foreign 
Minister, which might contain explicit statements about 
Brazil’s policy towards fragile states, either because they 
dealt with related matters, or because they were supposed 
to address the entirety of the government’s foreign policy. 
These statements were: Lula’s speech in the Conference 
on “Fighting Terrorism in Favour of Humanity” (New 
York, 09-22-2003), Celso Amorim’s opening statements 
at the “Seminar Brazil-Norway: Peace, Reconciliation and 
Mediation – New Themes of Foreign Policy” (Brasília, 10-
07-2003), his speech at the Ministerial Meeting of the UN 
Security Council (New York, 10-31-2005), his closing state-
ments at the Meeting of Itamaraty’s Heads of Diplomatic 
Missions (01-05-2006) and that at the London Conference 
on Afghanistan (01-31-2006). 
We will not find, as noted above, any explicit mention of 
state fragility or any clear proposals to deal 
with its international outcomes. However, 
these statements present a very clear sense 
of President Lula’s views about the causes 
and consequences of state weakness, in par-
ticular those related to the inability of weak states to pro-
vide a minimum share of general welfare to a part of their 
citizens. The following argument is very straightforward:
The lack of access to essential goods, including education 
and cultural goods tears down the social fabric and cause 
the individuals to be vulnerable. This situation may result in 
the proliferation of a variety of unlawful activities, includ-
ing organized crime and terrorism (Lula, 2003). 
Besides a limited or nonexistent access to essential 
goods, additional causes of individual vulnerability are the 
“… vulnerability of the youth to the dissemination of ex-
tremist ideals [and the] inequalities of empowerment de-
riving from foreign (military) occupation” (Lula, 2003).
A choice is made in Lula’s conception of the interna-
tional outcomes of state weakness, such as domestic and 
international conflicts, emigration, terrorism or transna-
tional crime8. Weakness, fragility or vulnerability does not 
disable the state, whose failure reduces its capacity to en-
force the rule of law, causing the society and the state to be 
vulnerable to unlawful activities. In Lula’s perception, it is 
a vulnerability that affects individuals, who become unaf-
fected by the rule of law and, in due course, vulnerable to 
extremist ideals. 
In that sense there is not an international issue about 
weak, vulnerable states that could be the origin of peace and 
security threats. There is, rather, an international quandary 
with respect to vulnerable individuals who lack access to 
general welfare, and therefore are prone to unlawful activi-
ties, including terrorism. The conclusion is clear: the target 
of international cooperation is not the weak state and its 
institutions and political processes (or lack thereof), but 
individuals excluded from general welfare.
A similar idea is clear in Amorim’s opening speech in 
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the Brazil/Norway Seminar on ‘Peace, Reconciliation and 
Mediation’. Again, the causes and consequences of state 
fragility are clearly stated:
Although poverty and inequalities cannot, in absolutely 
any event, entail an excuse for violence, it is unquestionably 
true that poverty and inequalities create an environment 
propitious to the dissemination of extreme ideas and ac-
tions (Amorim, 2003).
Due perhaps to the context of the seminar, which as-
sumes the existence of contending states, this time the 
Brazilian diplomatic rhetoric introduces states, acting in 
bilateral or multilateral relations, as a key to the solution of 
terrorism – a direct result of vulnerable groups of individ-
uals. However, international cooperation between states is 
called upon, not to provide aid and support to vulnerable 
individuals, but to address asymmetric relationships be-
tween states. In this surprising argument, “… the relevance 
of multilateralism, the relevance of International Law, and 
the relevance of the UN Security Council” are predictably 
underlined, but no elaboration is offered about their role in 
the approach to fragile states. (The mention of the Security 
Council, however, brings about the opportunity to under-
line once again the need to reform its membership.) Yet, 
some elaboration is given to the ubiquitous causal relation-
ship between poverty and international threats related to 
state fragility. “It is impossible nowadays to speak about 
peace and reconciliation without mentioning also some 
economic issues,” the minister states. He concludes: “It is 
the reason why we have to look after the international eco-
nomic relations. It is up to us to search for more equitable 
rules, for negotiations under the rule of parity” (Amorim, 
2003).
Amorim’s implicit linkage between asymmetric trade 
relations and terrorism clarifies the above-mentioned Lula 
quotation about the causal relationship between asym-
metries of power resulting from foreign occupation and 
terrorism. As a matter of fact, if individual vulnerabil-
ity and the resulting propensity to unlawful activities are 
mainly affected by asymmetries of power among states, 
then the fight against asymmetry among states is the 
strongest remedy for the vulnerability of individuals and 
the ensuing propensity of vulnerable individuals to unlaw-
ful activities9.
The next document examined is the closing statement 
by Ambassador Amorim in the Meeting of Itamaraty’s 
Heads of Diplomatic Missions, in a speech to present an 
informal account of the Lula administration’s accomplish-
ments. After enumerating a long list of bonuses in the well-
known commemorative rhetoric of Itamaraty, Amorim 
concludes by elaborating extensively10 on the UN Security 
Council (SC) and the alleged progresses made by Lula’s 
Administration in its quest for a permanent SC seat for 
Brazil. No mention is made of the issue of fragile states 
and the role played by the UN, or by Brazil for that matter, 
in dealing with possible regional or global threats associ-
ated with the fragility of states, not even to acknowledge 
the Brazilian contribution to the UN mission in Haiti.
The last document, the Foreign Minister’s speech to the 
January 2006 London Conference on Afghanistan, does 
not seem to fit with the landscape described. First, it only 
indirectly mentions the issue of weak states, which was the 
central purpose of the Conference on Afghanistan. In his 
speech, Ambassador Amorim salutes the “… international 
support for the building of a peaceful, democratic and pros-
perous Afghanistan” and acknowledges the roadmap “to 
overcome a legacy of social and economic stagnation, po-
litical violence and foreign interference” (Amorim, 2006b). 
He does not oppose, as Lula did in his New York statement, 
institutional building to economic and social development: 
they must go hand-in-hand. Additionally, Amorim lists 
Haiti, East Timor and “many countries in Africa” in the 
same context as Afghanistan as states in need of regional 
and multilateral cooperation. He 
goes as far as including counter-
narcotics strategies in economic 
rehabilitation, and suggests that 
economic rehabilitation “… pre-
supposes helping the Afghan 
farmers to develop alternative 
crops for which adequate market access should be provid-
ed” (Amorim, 2006b).
For Brazil’s neighbours, deeply affected by state failure 
associated with drug trafficking, regional cooperation does 
not apply, or so Lula’s Administration perceives. Brazil 
has consistently opposed any international cooperation 
to fight against drug trafficking; either military, as in the 
Plan Colombia, or the eradication of drug-related crops, 
because drug-trafficking is supposed to result from deep 
social causes.
Colliding Demands
My hypothesis to explain Lula’s failure to address the is-
sue of state vulnerability is his inability to solve the internal 
conflicts with his government, his congressional coalition, 
and his own party that result from colliding agendas. Lula’s 
government adopted colliding foreign policy agendas as the 
outcome of diverse and often diverging demands originat-
ing both in Lula’s Party and in Lula’s Administration. The 
PT is a large coalition of social and political movements, 
ranging from the moderate to the far left. Lula’s govern-
ment coalition ranges from the far left to the right and is 
openly supported by far right nationalist interest groups. 
For Brazil’s neighbours, deeply affected by state failure 
associated with drug trafficking, regional cooperation does 
not apply, or so Lula’s Administration perceives.
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All of Itamaraty’s relevant economic and political decision-
making is centralized in the hands of a coalition group that 
shares a particular mix of Marxist and national populist 
economic views – the neo-desarrollismo.
At least three relevant coalitions, adopting diverging 
political-economic views, strive to influence the Party’s 
decision-making. Though less influential than their coun-
terparts, the most visible are those composed of grass 
roots movements such as the self-styled Movement of the 
Landless (MST) and groups supported by the Catholic 
Church. 
The leadership of these social movements, including 
a significant part of the National Conference of Brazilian 
Bishops (CNBB), share very primitive economic views. A 
recent document from the Brazilian bishops, conceived 
as guidelines for a referendum, called for a rejection 
of Brazilian participation in the Free Trade Area of the 
Americas (FTAA) talks, and goes as far as to condemn ex-
ternal trade as artificial, favouring instead a self-contained 
economy. The MST’s most conspicuous leader, João Pedro 
Stedile, responding to a survey questionnaire, stated clear-
ly that one of the reasons the MST opposes hemispheric 
integration is that it would foster the agricultural industry, 
while MST favours family-based subsistence agriculture.
The PT’s grassroots members and leaders who share 
these views tend to support economic policies deemed to 
enhance the state’s capability to protect and subsidize the 
natural side of economic processes as opposed to the artifi-
cial side: family-based agriculture vs. agribusiness; domes-
tic market vs. trade; national vs. foreign firms; price and 
wage controls vs. market forces; social interests and values 
vs. commitment to contracts and to the rule of law.
Another political-economic view, probably the most 
widespread, is the Economics of National Populism. 
The political economy of their supporters is a legacy of 
the 1950s and 1970s desarrollismo (developmentalism). 
Supporters of National Populism are still nostalgic for the 
successes of import substitution industrialization (ISI), es-
pecially in Brazil. I do not have to elaborate on the well-
known principles and policies of ISI. Suffice it to say that 
the notion of the superiority of growth-oriented policies, 
led by the government and based on protected and over-
regulated domestic markets, have been the core of PT’s 
national electoral program for the last thirteen years and 
were only swept under the carpet, during the 2002 presi-
dential elections, to avoid the risk of defeat.
This part of the PT’s program may have been swept un-
der the carpet but was not disavowed. In the aftermath of 
Lula’s electoral landslide, it was common among academ-
ics, including some who now share an office in the Planalto 
Palace11, to predict a radical change from the economic 
policies adopted in previous governments. Such changes 
would include a reversal of the privatization program, 
huge investments by the federal government to restart the 
economy, deep cuts in the interest rates and a reversal of 
the monetary policy favouring a controlled rate of infla-
tion, in addition to some kind of wage and price policy. 
In addition, in the first PT Conference during the new 
Lula administration a number of policy statements were 
approved in direct opposition to the current monetary 
and fiscal policies, despite the efforts of the government to 
avoid them.
A significant part of Lula’s administration, mainly in 
the area of social policy and the spending-regulatory min-
istries, was assigned to adherents of national populism. Be 
it housing, transportation, energy – including Petrobras, 
the state owned oil multinational company – communi-
cations, or the huge Brazilian 
Development Bank (BNDES), 
all the decision-making has 
been assigned to factions that 
share national populist econom-
ic views.
Still another vision is shared 
by an important component of PT’s leadership. It is wide-
ly acknowledged that a significant number of former 
Marxist-oriented parties and militant groups, which were 
designated illegal by the military regime, joined PT at 
its origin. While reformed Marxists had joined centre-
oriented parties, such as PMDB and later PSDB12, most 
“Old Bolsheviks” who joined the PT maintained their eco-
nomic views consistent with Lenin’s theory of imperialism. 
Economic policies, they believe, directly reflect the inter-
ests of the dominant capitalist class and are a prerogative 
of state power. In order to reverse the hegemony of impe-
rialist interests in peripheral countries, it is necessary to 
oppose, and if possible reverse, the hegemony of the major 
capitalist countries, especially the United States. 
Historically Marxist parties and movements have been 
in a critical alliance13 with national populism in Brazil, but 
their views often overlap. In Lula’s government they tend 
to support all policies, particularly foreign policy, favoured 
by the neo-desarrollismo. In this regard, foreign policy is 
the area where the old Bolshevik agenda is more at home. 
All of Itamaraty’s relevant economic and political decision-
making is centralized in the hands of a coalition group that 
shares this particular mix of Marxist and national populist 
economic views.
Aside from the above-mentioned families of economic 
ideas, Lula’s governmental coalition adds a few more. The 
most relevant are those pragmatically adopted by Antonio 
Palocci, Minister of Economy and the team he assembled 
to obtain external credibility to reverse the crisis triggered 
by Lula’s election. Neither Palocci himself nor any of his 
PT colleagues ever shared neo-liberal ideas or favoured 
monetary stability, privatization, integration with the US 
economy, or even the desirability of agreeing with IMF 
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Lula personal agenda aims at providing him a stage from 
which he can act as a protagonist in the world scene. Such 
a capacity of world leadeship is believed to be instrumental 
for securing Lula’s domestic leadership.
conditions. As a matter of fact, it has proven impossible, or 
at least undesirable, to staff the high level Ministerial and 
Central Bank political appointments with PT affiliates. 
Then again, the ideas of fiscal responsibility, monetary 
stability, market oriented deregulation, conservative inter-
est rates and exchange rates policies are supported by a very 
heterogeneous coalition which includes politicians such as 
Palocci himself, banking and investment industry execu-
tives, businessmen and bureaucrats. Their main cement is 
the pragmatic goal of keeping an economic crisis at bay. 
No one knows what will happen if and when the external 
vulnerability is overcome and a policy of sustained growth, 
as opposed to sustained stability, is on the table. My view 
is that the only thing that keeps the reins of economic pol-
icy in Palocci’s hands is the threat of external crisis. Every 
time the prospect of blossoming economic growth (to use 
the President’s metaphor) is raised, Palocci’s policies are 
relentlessly assailed by his fellow party and government 
members, not to mention a part of the business commu-
nity.
The government includes still other pragmatic groups 
well represented by the Vice-President’s party – the Liberal 
Party (Partido Liberal, PL) – which, like other small right-
of-centre political parties supporting Lula’s government, 
is well known as a league of special interests. Combining 
socially conservative populist views with the advocacy of 
state-led growth, these groups tend to support a combina-
tion of the above, provided that it concurs with their own 
ad hoc interests. They also tend to challenge Mr. Palocci’s 
options.
To assert his options externally, President Lula and his 
government are acting differently in different arenas. The 
Treasury Ministry (Fazenda) and the Central Bank are al-
lotted policy responsibility for areas that could have an im-
pact on the perception of the country’s economic sound-
ness or the consistency of its monetary, fiscal and regu-
latory policies. Palocci, the Central Bank, and their team 
play by the rules and make this clear.
All the remaining international issues are dealt with by 
Itamaraty or the Presidency acting together or separately. 
Besides the formal diplomatic arenas involving interna-
tional organizations and regimes, Itamaraty initiated sev-
eral mini-lateral forums under Lula, and tends to pack the 
presidential agenda with as many meetings of international 
leaders as he can possibly attend.
While the arenas of monetary system and financial mat-
ters are under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Fazenda and 
the Central Bank, and the prevailing goals are essentially 
consistent with ensuring an external environment favour-
ing the country’s stability and sustained growth, the rest is 
a battlefield for the remaining ideas and goals supported by 
different factions in the party and in the administration. 
My hypothesis, however, is that it is possible to see some 
rationality in the present Brazilian foreign policy, provided 
we assume that the Lula Administration is striving to im-
plement three separate agendas, which it perceives as a sin-
gle one. While compatible in theory, these three agendas 
occasionally, and inevitably in the long term, aim at con-
flicting goals. The three agendas may be described as fol-
lows: a) the permanent agenda; b) Lula’s personal agenda; 
and c) the ideological agenda.
Colliding Agendas
The permanent, or traditional, agenda may be defined 
by three major goals: 
• to promote a friendly external environment for the 
growth of the Brazilian economy and for its financial 
stability; 
• to avoid any resemblance of submission to US goals 
and interests; and 
• to avoid or, at least postpone, further integration with 
the US economy. (Albuquerque, 2006, p. 502)
This agenda is universally acknowledged and needs no 
additional comment14. Lula’s personal agenda aims at pro-
viding the President with a stage from which he can act as 
a protagonist on the world scene. Such a capacity of world 
leadership is believed to be instrumental for securing Lula’s 
domestic leadership under eventual adverse conditions.
Despite his ability to calm the worst expectations of 
the markets regarding his cabinet’s capacity to deal with 
macroeconomic issues, Lula proved unable to accomplish 
a minimum portion of his do-
mestic campaign promises. In 
contrast, his closest aides and 
members of his inner cabinet 
soon realized that the President 
enjoyed an international audi-
ence far wider than his Brazilian 
public. Unlike the domestic 
front, his domestic limitations and weaknesses were ir-
relevant to the international audience and, which is even 
more helpful, it was prepared to take whatever Lula said or 
did at face value.
Lula’s amazing talent for moving hearts and minds on a 
global scale had a great impact on his own domestic cred-
ibility. As a consequence, those closest aides and members 
of his inner cabinet were persuaded that the impact of the 
presidential performance on foreign audiences of all kinds 
represented a prime asset, ready to strengthen his fading 
domestic prominence.
The ideological agenda assumes that Lula’s accession to 
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executive power in Brazil would be the basis for radical 
political and social changes domestically as well as interna-
tionally. If that premise were correct, his Administration’s 
foreign policy would be instrumental in promoting the 
emergence of a new world order, deemed to transcend the 
current globalization process and its primary supporter, 
the global predominance of the United States.
The fact of the matter is that when we examine a signifi-
cant sample of Lula’s foreign policy actions, it appears clear 
that a convergence of ideological priorities with Lula’s per-
sonal agenda has always taken the best of the traditional, 
rather pragmatic economic agenda. The ideological pri-
orities are taken for granted as a valuable goal, and tend to 
overshadow any considerations of context, opportunity or 
cost (economic and political). Lula’s expectations of global 
leadership have been clearly over-rated as a consequence 
of the President’s astonishing international recognition. 
As a result, Lula’s foreign policy has been blamed for 
its erratic appearance, but under closer analysis, we can 
demonstrate that it is not the effect of sheer inconsistency, 
but rather suggests consistency with colliding goals. These 
separate actions are implemented as if they converged with 
at least one of the agendas pointed out before. It is theoreti-
cally possible that even conflicting interests could agree on 
a specific course of action, while pursuing colliding agen-
das. However, nothing can demand that every course of 
action should always be consistent with every remaining 
agenda.
The chief issue is to know how priorities are established 
that allow the approval of certain initiatives to the detri-
ment or postponement of others. We can solve this prob-
lem by taking into consideration the following factors: 
• Lula’s well publicized vision of international affairs; 
• the prevailing ideas among his chief advisors about 
both international relations and the domestic re-
sponses and motivations of public opinion; and 
• the well known proclivities of the current Itamaraty 
decision-makers. 
All things considered, the most probable is that in most 
issues, two different agendas could be reconciled in the 
same program or course of action. Inescapably though, the 
third goal is dismissed and, in that case, the most likely 
candidate for rejection is the traditional agenda, the one 
committed to the financial and economic credibility of the 
country.
Indeed, the permanent economic and financial agen-
da of Brazilian foreign policy is increasingly confined to 
the cabinet areas of agriculture and foreign trade as well 
as to factions inside Itamaraty that continue to adhere 
to Cardoso’s agenda. While still somewhat influential, 
these senior diplomats take no part in the most relevant 
decisions, however. In contrast, Lula’s personal agenda is 
predominantly championed by his closest aides and by 
his hard-core cabinet members. Similarly, the ideologi-
cal agenda is typically backed by a coalition of leading 
diplomats with inflexible nationalistic and leftist drives 
(the most conspicuous is certainly the vice-Minister, Mr. 
Pinheiro Guimarães), not to mention Lula’s special advisor 
for International Affairs, Mr. Marco Aurélio Garcia.
As a matter of fact, both the policies adopted consonant 
with the ideological agenda and those tailor-made in order 
to inflate Lula’s persona may be backed by the supporters of 
Itamaraty’s traditional agenda. Itamaraty’s support would 
be secured whenever such policies appear to be compatible 
with the attainment of traditional goals, given that such 
policies are kept inside the Itamaraty’s rituals of cautious 
diplomatic handling. Additionally, for the Planalto inner 
circle, the ideological agenda tends to add up to one and 
the same as Lula’s personal agenda, for it often implies 
some leading role in world af-
fairs, as the Brazilian President 
is allegedly entitled to. The 
traditional agenda, however, 
often implies unpopular meas-
ures that are both costly and 
that downgrade the President’s 
domestic leadership.
What is more, when we consider the current Itamaraty’s 
leadership, known for its nationalistic and leftist tenden-
cies, the enhancement of Lula’s domestic and international 
role is instrumental for the accomplishment of their po-
litical beliefs. As for the traditional foreign policy agenda, 
while suitable as subordinate goals, they are deemed irrec-
oncilable with plans to change the country and the world 
system. Though it may appear surprising, Mr. Pinheiro 
Guimarães has recently affirmed, before undergraduate 
students at the University of Sao Paulo, that Brazil has in-
deed the power to change international rules according to 
its own national interests.
The traditional agenda is the most capable of stirring 
resistance from inside the government coalition, while at 
the same time it is the least likely to command wide sup-
port. In contrast, any combination of the ideological and 
personal agendas is destined to prevail over any resistance 
coming from the areas favouring the traditional agenda. 
The overall result of the differing abilities of diverse deci-
sion-makers to gather support or, quite reverse, to generate 
resistance to their initiatives, is that the apparent inconsist-
ency of Lula’s foreign policy is that it follows the path of 
least resistance. Its only asset is the presumed low cost of 
international action and the unlimited external credibility 
of Lula himself. Both beliefs are likely to prove unrealistic.
The permanent economic and financial agenda of Brazilian 
foreign policy is increasingly confined to the cabinet areas 
of agriculture and foreign trade as well as to factions inside 
Itamaraty that continue to adhere to Cardoso’s agenda. 
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Notas
1 In the present context, social injustice stands for social 
injustice, endemic hunger and poverty, so often associated with 
the Lula Presidency.
2 A career diplomat, Ambassador Guimarães served the former 
administration as head of an important centre for academic 
and policy studies of the Brazilian Foreign Ministry, and 
was well known for his criticism and opposition to President 
Cardoso’s foreign policy, especially concerning the Free Trade 
Area of the Americas (FTAA) and Brazil’s bilateral relations 
with the United States. Prior to the presidential election 
in 2002, Guimarães was discharged, after having publicly 
disagreed with the government policies, and played an 
important role during the 2002 elections, openly supporting 
the opposition’s candidate, Lula. Guimarães was instrumental 
in the appointment of his personal friend, Ambassador Celso 
Amorim, as Foreign Minister and is reputed to be the most 
influential decision-maker regarding Lula’s foreign agenda.
3 The Brazilian Foreign Ministry is known as Itamaraty, after 
the Palace Itamaraty, a former seat of the Brazilian government 
in Rio de Janeiro, later the traditional headquarters of its 
diplomacy. Itamaraty also applies collectively to the Brazilian 
diplomatic corps and to the specific ethos of Brazilian 
diplomacy.
4 The Group of Rio is the successor to the Contadora Group, 
an initiative of former Venezuelan President Andrés Perez 
aimed at the pacification of Central American conflicts in the 
1970s, and later turned into the Contadora Support Group. The 
Group of Rio comprises a number of major Latin-American 
countries, such as Brazil, México and Argentina, and a number 
of representatives of other Latin-American countries.
5 A political initiative of the Spanish government, then strongly 
supported by México, the Ibero-American Summit comprises 
all Latin-American countries plus Portugal and Spain and, 
unlike similar forums, includes Cuba as a member.
6 The G-15 is a group of leading developing countries engaged 
in the South-South dialogue.
7 A Brazilian initiative, together with fellow African and Latin-
American countries, aimed at establishing a non-nuclear zone 
in the Southern Atlantic.
8 In the present context, the speech is only referring to 
terrorism and extremist ideals.
9 The relevance assigned to asymmetry among states may be the 
rationale behind the over-politicized foreign policy adopted by 
Lula’s government.
10 About 800 words out of 3.000 for the entire speech.
11 “Planalto Palace”, or “Planalto” for short, is the Presidential 
Palace in Brasília.
12 PMDB is the Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro 
(Brazilian Democratic Movement Party), and PSDB is the 
Partido da Social-Democracia Brasileira (Brazilian Social-
Democracy Party).
13 Critical alliance means allied with Lula’s party but still critical 
of it.
14 About the permanent agenda of Brazilian foreign policy see 
Albuquerque (2003, pp. 267-287).
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